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The United States Supreme Court has developed a legal doctrine — the “reserved rights doctrine” — that allows the United 
States to “reserve” water for use on federal lands, 
regardless of the laws of the state where the lands 
are located.  Notwithstanding, the United States 
Department of the Interior and the State of Colorado 
recently reached an agreement under which the 
United States will rely on a combination of federal 
and state water rights — a “reserved” right under 
federal law and a state-based right under Colorado 
law — to serve the needs of a national park in 
Colorado.  The United States’ approach of relying 
on combined federal and state rights departs from its 
traditional approach, which has been to rely wholly 
on federal reserved rights in using water on federal 
lands.  This innovative, historic approach creates 
an important precedent for meeting the needs of 
federal reserved lands, one that invites the states to 
participate in the process; this, in turn, may signal 
closer cooperation between the federal government 
and the states in managing the nation’s water 
resources.  This paper describes the origins and 
nature of the reserved rights doctrine, and how the 
doctrine played a pivotal role in the recent agreement 
involving the national park in Colorado.
The Reserved Rights Doctrine
The states were regarded earlier in our national 
history as having exclusive authority to regulate 
water, subject only to the federal power to regulate 
navigation.  After the American Revolution, 
the King of England’s sovereignty over water 
passed to the original thirteen states.  The states 
delegated authority in the Constitution to the 
federal government to regulate interstate commerce 
— and hence to regulate navigable waters, which 
were, at least at that time, a vital link to interstate 
commerce.  Otherwise, however, the states retained 
their sovereignty over water.  When new states 
were admitted to statehood, they were admitted on 
an “equal footing” with other states, and thus also 
acquired sovereign interests in their waters (Martin 
v. Waddell 1842, Shively v. Bowlby 1894).  
The Supreme Court and Congress have often 
recognized the states’ primacy over water.  When 
Congress passed land and mining laws in the late- 
nineteenth century authorizing settlement and 
mining of federal lands in the West, it provided 
that the settlers’ and miners’ water rights were 
governed by state laws, not national laws.  In 1935, 
the Supreme Court held that these land and mining 
laws “severed” the water on the public lands, and 
thus that the states control the use of water even 
though the federal government owns the lands 
(California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland 
Cement Co. 1935).  More recently, the Supreme 
Court held that Congress, in passing a 1902 statute 
authorizing the federal government to build projects 
to reclaim the arid western lands, required that 
the federal projects must comply with state water 
rights laws (California v. United States 1978).  As 
the Court stated, Congress’ reclamation policies are 
interwoven with a “consistent thread of purposeful 
and continued deference to state water law …. ” 
(438 U.S. at 653).     
In 1908, the Supreme Court substantially 
limited the states’ traditional authority to regulate 
water (Winters v. United States 1908).  In Winters, 
Indian tribes occupying the Fort Belknap Indian 
Reservation in Montana began diverting water to the 
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reservation to irrigate the lands.  Many homesteaders 
had been diverting water from the same river for 
many years to irrigate their own lands, thus leaving 
no water for the tribes.  The United States sued 
the homesteaders on behalf of the tribes, arguing 
that the tribes had a superior claim to the water. 
The Supreme Court agreed.  The Court held that 
Congress has the right to reserve water for use on 
Indian reservations that have been reserved from the 
public domain; this right, the Court said, is based 
on the Property Clause of the Constitution, which 
allows Congress to regulate federal lands.  The Court 
also held that Congress, in creating the Fort Belknap 
Reservation, impliedly reserved water for the tribes’ 
irrigation needs, even though Congress had not 
clearly addressed the subject when it created the 
reservation.  This decision established what became 
known as the “Winters Doctrine.”  Under this 
doctrine, the United States impliedly reserves water 
for use on Indian reservations when it creates the 
reservations.  As originally conceived, the Winters 
Doctrine applied only to Indian reservations.  
The Supreme Court subsequently expanded the 
Winters Doctrine by applying it to all federal land 
reservations, not just Indian reservations (Arizona 
v. California 1963, Cappaert v. United States 1976). 
The doctrine now applies for example, to national 
parks, national forests, national monuments, national 
wildlife refuge areas, and other federal lands.  The 
doctrine in its expanded form is generally known 
as the “federal reserved rights doctrine.”  Under 
this doctrine, when Congress reserves lands from 
the public domain, it impliedly reserves sufficient 
water to serve the purposes for which the lands were 
reserved.  The amount of the reserved water is that 
“necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, 
no more,” (Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138), and “without 
[which] the purposes of the reservation would be 
entirely defeated,” (United States v. New Mexico 
1978).  In Cappaert, the Supreme Court held that 
the reserved rights doctrine precludes ground 
water pumping that reduced water levels and thus 
endangered the pupfish in Devil’s Hole, a national 
monument in Nevada.  
The priority of a federal reserved water right, 
as against the rights of other users under state law, 
is based on the date that the lands were withdrawn 
from the public domain.  Thus, the reserved right is 
senior to private water rights acquired under state 
law after the lands were reserved, and junior to water 
rights acquired before the lands were reserved.  As 
a practical matter, many if not most federal land 
reservations supporting reserved rights occurred 
relatively early in the West’s history, and thus 
federal reserved rights generally are senior to most 
rights acquired under state law.  As the Supreme 
Court has stated, “claims to water for use on federal 
reservations inescapably vie with other public and 
private claims for the limited quantities to be found in 
the rivers and streams,” and “when … a river is fully 
appropriated, federal reserved rights will frequently 
require a gallon-for-gallon reduction in the amount 
of water available for water-needy state and private 
appropriators”  (New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 705).
Recognizing these impacts on state regulation and 
private rights, the Supreme Court in 1978 substantially 
limited the reserved rights doctrine, at least as applied 
to non-Indian lands.  In United States v. New Mexico, 
supra, 438 U.S. 696, the Court held that reserved 
water rights apply only to “primary” reservation 
purposes, not “secondary” reservation purposes.  In 
that case, the United States Forest Service claimed 
reserved water rights for instream flows in the Rio 
Mimbres in New Mexico, asserting that such instream 
flows were necessary to serve the purposes of the 
Gila National Forest; the specified purposes were 
recreation, aesthetics, wildlife and cattle grazing, 
among others.  The United States claimed the reserved 
rights under authority of the Forest Service’s Organic 
Administration Act of 1897 and the Multiple-Use 
Sustained-Yield Act (MUSYA) of 1960. The Supreme 
Court rejected the United States’ position.  The Court 
ruled that Congress impliedly reserved water rights in 
the Organic Act and MUSYA only for two “primary” 
reservation purposes — securing favorable conditions 
of water flows and furnishing a continuous supply 
of timber — and that Congress did not impliedly 
reserve water for “secondary” reservation uses, such 
as providing instream flows for wildlife and other 
purposes. The Court stated:
  
Where water is necessary to fulfill the very 
purposes for which a federal reservation was 
created, it is reasonable to conclude, even in 
the face of Congress’ express deference to 
state water law in other areas, that the United 
States intended to reserve the necessary water.  
Where water is only valuable for a secondary 
use of the reservation, however, there arises 
the contrary inference that Congress intended, 
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consistent with its other views, that the United 
States would acquire water in the same manner 
as any other public or private appropriator.  (438 
U.S. at 702).
The Black Canyon of the Gunnison 
National Park
In 1933, President Herbert Hoover issued a 
proclamation creating a national monument — the 
Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Monument 
— in a stretch of the Gunnison River in Colorado. 
The Black Canyon consists of steep, rocky gorges 
that are among the most spectacular gorges found 
anywhere in the United States.  The monument’s 
purposes, according to the proclamation, are “for the 
preservation of the spectacular gorges and additional 
features of scenic, scientific, and educational purpose.” 
In 1999, Congress designated the monument as a 
national park, which is known as the Black Canyon 
of the Gunnison National Park (Park).  
Many years after President Hoover created the 
original monument, Congress created a reclamation 
project — the Aspinall Unit — on a stretch of the 
Gunnison River above the Park.  Authorized by 
Congress in 1956, the Aspinall Unit provides water 
supplies for irrigation, domestic use, industrial 
needs, recreation, and other uses.  The Gunnison 
River is a tributary of the Colorado River, which 
is a major water source for several western states, 
including Colorado.  The Aspinall Unit is part of 
a larger congressional plan — embodied in the 
Colorado River Storage Project Act — to develop 
Colorado’s share of Colorado River water for the 
state’s future growth needs.   
In creating the Aspinall Unit, Congress ordered 
that construction cannot commence until the U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation, which is responsible for 
operating the project, has examined the “economic 
justification” for the project and has concluded that 
“the benefits of such unit will exceed the costs.” 
The Bureau of Reclamation, after reviewing the 
matter, submitted its economic justification report 
to Congress.  The report concluded that the project 
was economically justified based on the Bureau of 
Reclamation’s proposed operational plan, which, 
among other things, assumed a minimum annual flow 
of water through the Park at the rate of 100 cubic-
feet-per second (cfs).  On the basis of this report, the 
project was built and commenced operations.  
As the demands for Gunnison River water increased, 
some water users brought an action in the Colorado 
Water Court for a general stream adjudication, seeking 
a declaration of the respective rights and priorities 
of all water users in the river.  The United States 
was named as a party in the adjudication pursuant 
to a federal statute, the McCarran Amendment, that 
waives the United States’ sovereign immunity in 
general stream adjudications.
In 1971, the United States filed a claim in the 
adjudication for a reserved water right for the Park. 
The Colorado Water Court assigned the United 
States’ claim to a Special Master, who, after hearing 
the matter, recommended that the United States’ 
reserved rights claim be recognized.  The Colorado 
Water Court agreed with the recommendation.  
On appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court, 
the state’s high Court in 1982 upheld the United 
States’ reserved rights claim.  The Court stated that 
the “purpose” of the monument is to “conserve 
and maintain in an unimpaired condition the 
scenic, aesthetic, natural, and historic objects of 
the monument, as well as the wildlife therein.” 
According to the Court, these uses include “direct 
flow and storage rights, transportation rights, and well 
rights” for myriad purposes — such as “recreational 
uses,” “domestic uses,” “agricultural and irrigation,” 
among many others. 
Although the Colorado Supreme Court upheld 
the United States’ reserved right claim, the Court did 
not quantify the United States’ right by determining 
the amount of water necessary to satisfy it.  Instead, 
the Court remanded this issue back to the Colorado 
Water Court.
Nineteen years later, on January 17, 2001, the 
United States applied to the Colorado Water Court 
for quantification of the Park’s reserved right. 
The application requested recognition of reserved 
rights for both (1) an annual “base flow” of water 
and (2) annual “peak and shoulder flows.”  The 
“base flows” are the relatively low-volume flows 
that occur more or less continuously throughout 
the year, and the “peak and shoulder flows” are 
the episodic, high-volume flows that occur during 
spring runoff periods, and which vary from year to 
year depending on the amount of rainfall.  According 
to the application, the Park’s reserved right would 
have a priority date of November 13, 1957, which 
is the date that the Aspinall Unit project acquired 
its water rights
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natural flow, whichever is less.  This ensures that 
the Park will receive a continuous, although limited, 
flow of water during the entire year.  This reserved 
“base flow” right shall have a 1933 priority date, 
which is the date that the monument was originally 
created by presidential executive order.  This means 
that the Park’s “base flow” right shall have priority 
over the Apinall Unit’s water rights, which were 
acquired under Colorado law in 1957.  Thus, in 
times of extreme shortage, the Park’s reserved right 
must be served before the Aspinall Unit’s needs 
are met.  Also, since the reserved right is 300 cfs 
or “natural flow,” whichever is less, the Aspinall 
Unit is not required to release water to satisfy 
the Park’s reserved right during times of extreme 
shortage, when the river flow is less than 300 cfs; 
the Park is only entitled to “natural flow” under these 
circumstances, which is what the Park would have 
received if the Aspinall Unit had not been built.   
Second, the agreement provided that the Park 
shall have a water right for “peak and shoulder” 
flows under Colorado law, with a priority date of 
2003.  As noted, these “peak and shoulder” flows are 
episodic, high-volume flows resulting from spring 
runoff, which may vary greatly from year to year. 
Thus, the Park’s right to these high-volume flows 
will depend on Colorado law, not the reserved rights 
doctrine.  Since this state-based right has a 2003 
priority date, the right would be subordinate to the 
rights of the Aspinall Unit, which were acquired in 
1957, but would be senior to all rights acquired after 
2003 and would include all potential future water 
development both within and outside the Gunnison 
River basin.  Under the agreement, the United 
States will submit an application for its state-based 
right to the Colorado Water Conservation Board 
(CWCB), which is authorized under Colorado law 
to grant water right permits for “instream flows” of 
water.  Subsequently the United States submitted 
its application to the CWCB, which granted the 
“instream flow” rights.  
In effect, the agreement provided that the Park 
would have a combined federal and state water right — 
a federal reserved right for base flows of up to 300 cfs, 
and a state-based right for varying “instream” spring 
peak flows.  The Department of the Interior determined 
that this combination of federal and state rights would 
be sufficient to serve the Park’s reasonably foreseeable 
future needs, based on the river’s actual hydrology 
during the last twenty-six years.  
to the application, the Park’s reserved right would 
have a priority date of November 13, 1957, which 
is the date that the Aspinall Unit project acquired 
under state law.  This means that the Park’s reserved 
water right would have equal priority with the 
Aspinall Unit’s water rights, and thus, according 
to the application, the United States would have 
“flexibility” in managing the Aspinall Unit in order 
to meet the Park’s reserved rights.  
The Bureau of Reclamation, which is responsible 
for operating the Aspinall Unit, expressed some 
concerns about the amount of the United States’ 
reserved right claim.  The Bureau stated that the 
United States’ claim would potentially allow the 
Park to claim the entire amount of spring runoff 
flows, which may be 12,000 cfs or even higher, 
and that this would require the Bureau to allow 
large quantities of Gunnison River water to pass 
through the reclamation project, thus impairing the 
Bureau’s ability to store the water in order to meet 
its commitments to its contractors.  
The Agreement Between the          
Department of the Interior and     
the State of Colorado
The Department of the Interior, which administers 
the Park, eventually determined that the amount of 
water claimed by the United States as a reserved 
right for the Park was more than could be properly 
justified under the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. New Mexico, in that the amounts 
claimed were more than necessary to meet the Park’s 
“primary” needs.  The department also believed that 
the Park’s needs could be met by a combination 
of a federal reserved water right — reduced in 
accordance with the New Mexico decision — and 
a state-based water right under Colorado law. 
Accordingly, the Department of the Interior and the 
State of Colorado commenced negotiations for an 
agreement that would allow the United States to use 
water for the Park under a combined federal reserved 
right and a state-based right.  The parties reached 
an agreement on April 2, 2003, which was finalized 
by a Memorandum of Agreement signed on July 31, 
2003.  The agreement has two main parts.  
First, the agreement provided that the Park shall 
have a federal reserved water right to an annual 
“base flow” of water, in the amount of 300 cfs or 
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As a result of the agreement, the United States 
amended its application for a quantification of its 
water rights in the Colorado Water Court.  The 
United States withdrew its claim for a reserved right 
in the amounts claimed in the original application, 
in the amounts claimed in the original application, 
and instead claimed a federal reserved right for base 
flows of up to 300 cfs.  The United States has also 
filed a water right claim under Colorado law for 
“instream flows.”  The United States’ application 
is still pending.
Some environmental organizations brought a 
lawsuit against the United States, claiming that the 
United States has violated federal law by reducing 
the amount of its reserved rights claim, in that it 
has improperly disposed of federal property and 
delegated its responsibility to manage federal 
property without congressional approval.  This action 
is also still pending.  In the author’s judgment, these 
challenges are unmeritorious, because the Secretary 
of the Interior has broad, discretionary authority to 
determine the nature of federal property claims and 
has not exceeded such authority in this case. 
Conclusion
The agreement between the United States and 
Colorado regarding the Black Canyon of the 
Gunnison National Park has historic implications. 
This may be the first time, at least in the modern 
era, that the United States has agreed to acquire its 
water rights for a federal land reservation under a 
combination of federal and state laws, rather than 
relying wholly on federal law for its rights.  The 
United States’ innovative approach establishes a 
precedent that protects federal interests in reserved 
lands, while affording respect for the states’ 
traditional water rights authority and for private 
rights.  The Black Canyon agreement, if followed 
in other cases, may lead to greater cooperation 
between the federal government and the states in 
managing the nation’s water resources.  As water 
resources are subjected to growing demands caused 
by burgeoning populations and conservation needs, 
the intergovernmental cooperation manifested 
in the Black Canyon agreement becomes more 
important than ever.
